

THE CRISIS IN COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION*

By

Solon T. Kimball

Revolt against the social, political, and economic domination of the colonial overlords has recently flared in a number of places in the world. Javanese Nationalists have waged a bitter fight against British, Dutch and Japanese troops. Annamites in Indo-China bloodily resisted the return of French domination, who were aided by the British in suppressing demands for independence. There have been rumblings against the French in North Africa. There is intermittent trouble in Egypt, Syria and Palestine. The British are astride what may prove to be the bloodiest revolt and civil war in history in India. Even the United States may not escape from the turbulence, for the divisions and dissension in the Philippines are deep in the social and economic fabric of that country and may easily lead to armed civil strife. Native peoples in Burma, Malaya, and South Africa, are stirring uneasily and although some bloodshed is inevitable, the magnitude of the uprisings is not predictable from the facts now available.

The urge for political, economic, and cultural freedom is not new. If the restraining hand of a mother country rested so heavily on the American colonists that they felt forced to strike for freedom, how must the dark skinned natives of the modern world feel toward the control by racially different and culturally alien peoples? They have before them the pattern of overthrow of colonial overlordship by the United States and of the other American republics. They know of the centuries old fight of the Irish and the final victory after the last war.

Applied Anthropologists have an immediate interest in the current crisis because they represent major disturbances in the equilibrium of the social system in which native peoples are involved. This disequilibrium is not new. The Dutch, French, and British have had to suppress many revolts during the past several decades. What is new, is that in the case of the Asiatic possessions of these countries excepting India, the continuity of colonial control was broken by Japanese invasion and can be re-established, if at all, only on a different basis.

The price of freedom comes high. There are many dangers in independence. One could logically ask, would it not be better for many countries,

small in territory and population and economically weak to accept or continue in the status of a colonial possession? The logical answer might be "yes", but these decisions and these movements do not move in the ways of rational logic. Nevertheless, they have their own rationality and their own logic, which comes from the inner workings of society. They are interdependent with the systems of relations which unite men in purposeful activity, together with the sentiments and values which motivate to action and furnish rewards and punishment. Students of the science of human relations know that understanding, not of battles fought and won, but of reasons why colonial peoples are today in ferment, must come first from knowledge of the history and culture of the native groups, something of administrative organization and philosophy of the colonial powers, but basically there is need to examine the system of relations from which agreement or conflict arise as two peoples impinge upon each other. Broadly defined, these relationships include all economic, cultural (social), political and religious activities in which natives are affected by persons of the foreign power.

It is in the history of past relations that one should look to understand the present, and if comparative sociology has merit, one may expect to find generalizations applicable to all colonial situations. This permits the examination of a few situations in greater detail to understand the operation of sociological principles in others. Before a detailed analysis is attempted, however, it would be useful to sketch briefly the extent of the colonial problem, and to make some general observations on the characteristics of the colonial system, and certain problems basic to all colonial areas.

The magnitude of colonial problems when expressed by gross figures of area and population, reveals itself in startling proportions. If we exclude all the peoples living in the land area of Europe, Asiatic Russia, China, Japan, Australia, and the republics of the Western Hemisphere, and such nominally independent countries as those of the Near-East, there still remains approximately one-third of the earth's surface which is counted as colonial territory which is inhabited by 700,000,000 people, or

*Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Michigan State College.

better than one-third of world population. The colonial area rises to nearly half the land area if we include the aboriginal peoples who form cultural islands within the boundaries of free countries. These peoples include the Indians of the Amazon basin, the Andean highlands, the jungles of Central America, Western United States, Canada and Alaska. There are 15,000,000 of them. We can add to these totals the millions still living in tribal groups in Siberia and elsewhere in Asia. Although this does not exhaust the list, it is sufficient to impress one that a very large segment of the world's population still remains politically and economically dependent.

The distinctly colonial areas include India and southeast Asia (with the exception of Thailand), Formosa, Korea, the Netherland East Indies, the other islands of the Pacific except Australia and New Zealand, all of Africa except the Union of South Africa, tiny Liberia and possibly Abyssinia, and Greenland, Newfoundland, the islands of the Caribbeans, and a few small possessions along the coast of South and Central America.

The great colonial powers arranged in order of the people under their domination are, or were previous to the war, Great Britain, the Netherlands, France, Japan, the United States, Belgium, and Portugal.

The most crucial problems of the colonial areas include over-population and unbalanced economy with underdevelopment in some directions and destructive exploitation in others, cultural disintegration, racial and ethnic conflicts and tensions, inadequate educational and health facilities, and the absence of an effective representative or democratic system for the natives. Basic to all these difficulties is the organization and philosophy of colonial administration itself, and the relations of the superimposed bureaucracy, largely staffed by nationals of the controlling power, with the native peoples. Frequently, this bureaucracy is only incidentally responsive to the needs of the subject people. Its policies and procedures are determined by the larger considerations of national and economic interests and bureaucratic politics. Those natives who question its authority are labelled as impractical dreamers, self-seeking opportunists, agitators or political renegades, and repressive measures are frequently taken against them. Those who support the existing government authority are oftentimes branded as traitors by their own people.

If one is to understand the nature of the relations between native peoples and the colonial bureaucracy, it is necessary to know some of the prevailing characteristics of the colonial system. Dr. Raymond Kennedy, in a description of the present colonial situation, distinguishes five universal traits of colonialism.¹ Basic to all others is the "Color line". With the exception of the areas formerly controlled by Japan, colonial administrators in all parts of the world have white skins, while with minor exceptions the darker skinned peoples are the natives. The caste separation based on skin color and reinforced by culture differences appears in every possible relation, and in many instances is formalized by law. The social, political, and economic activities are shot through and through with racial and cultural considerations, and white men are always occupants of or accorded the opportunity to gain the most desirable positions.

The control of political power by the possessing nation with only slight delegation to the natives is a second trait. This authority is normally exercised in one of two ways. Direct rule is the term used to describe the situation in which the bureaucratic hierarchy through its members, applies policies directly. Indirect rule includes the utilization of an intermediary native political organization. Most colonial powers use both methods, although it is usually considered more desirable to retain the tractable chief, potentate, or sultan, and "advise" him what to do. The results are the same, for final authority, backed by police and military is retained by the administering power.

"Economic dependence upon and control by the mother country" is the third trait listed by Kennedy. It is generally true that colonial areas are more valuable if they are sources of raw materials rather than industrial competitors. With few exceptions, most colonial areas remain poorly developed industrially. Colonial areas are not unique in this respect, however, for there are many independent countries, as for example, Bolivia, where there is practically no industry. There is a difference, however, for Bolivia can achieve economic advancement without the approval of an external master.

His fourth trait, that of a "very low stage of development of social services, especially education", also applies to most colonial areas, but again is not a unique characteristic for there are countries, or portions of countries where the same condition exists.

¹ Kennedy, Raymond, "The Colonial Crisis and the Future," in "The Science of Man in the World Crisis," edited by Ralph Linton (New York, 1945) pp. 306-346.

The lack of social contact between natives and the ruling caste is Kennedy's last point, and is related to the sharply drawn color line. Considerable variation appears as between nationalities in the extent to which this is observed. British colonial areas are notorious for the exclusiveness of the ruling white caste, while the French and Portuguese neither draw the color line to the same extent, nor are contacts limited only to the official.

These traits of colonialism are supported, as Kennedy points out, by rationalizations which justify the existing system. These are widely believed by the administrators and it is easy to adduce evidence to verify them to the satisfaction of the ruling group. The caste system is sanctioned by belief in the inferiority of the natives. That subject peoples do not occupy positions of importance in the political, economic, or social world is listed as evidence of their incapability. Being inferior it is only natural that they should be segregated or excluded, runs the thinking of the colonial.

Caste behavior, however, is a product of the colonial situation, not its cause. The invidious comparisons are made by those who occupy the top echelons of the bureaucracy and those who control the economic system. It is this group which believes that the natives are incapable of ruling themselves. They argue that if one gives political responsibility to a native, he will immediately use it to his own advantage. Examples will be found of natives in lower governmental positions who have betrayed their trust or proved incapable. Obviously, so the argument runs, intelligent and impartial management depends upon the continuation of existing control. Natives will be happy and there will be justice for all. The concession will sometimes be made, that perhaps after a long period of time, with education and experience, the natives will be prepared to take over greater responsibility. They can then be trusted not to work against their own welfare. But, the proponent of colonial administration will add, "we can never really grant independence because, without our guiding hand all sorts of dire things might happen". In particular, they might fall victim to the military might of some aggressor or the need may arise to step in and straighten out internal affairs.

The new word for describing colonial relationships is "trusteeship". This concept also presupposes the present incapability of a native people to rule themselves and justifies the retention of political and economic control. It carries a moral tone of stewardship and responsibility, which, if the need arises, will be enforced by military might. Re-

alistically, no country, except possibly the United States, is going to relinquish any of its colonial possessions, except under the threat of superior power. It is possible, however, that some powers may take the "trusteeship" responsibility sufficiently seriously to actively seek ways and means of bringing natives to the point of political independence. Certainly, the pressure of world opinion and the demands of native peoples are going to force continued amelioration.

These changes are going to bring the need for answers to many questions which have either been avoided or not recognized. One of the basic questions is that of assimilation and acculturation. Should the natives be westernized, or is it wiser to preserve, within limits, the basic cultural forms? The answer to this question will determine in large measure the kind and extent of economic development and industrialization, the establishment of education and health facilities, the granting of permission to missionaries for proselytizing, the form of government and the extent to which natives are included, and a whole series of related questions.

There is, at present, wide variation of national policy on this basic question. At one extreme is the former French policy of making all natives full citizens of France as soon as they had been culturally assimilated. With the absence of racial discrimination France was also willing to assimilate by intermarriage these newcomers to political and cultural France. Generally speaking, the policy has not been successful, and the bloody revolts in North Africa after the First World War, and of the Annamites in Indo-China, as well as recent trouble in Syria causes one to ask whether the policy was adequately implemented or whether the natives were anxious to become Gallicized, or both.

The American colonial policy to the extent that there has been one, has been acculturation, although our racial prejudices have been a barrier to full accomplishment. Our relations with the American Indians and the people of the Philippines have included emphasis on education, health, teaching of the English language, American customs, law, concepts of property, and technology. Although there are many black pages in the history of our treatment of subject peoples, on the whole, this policy has produced a greater measure of loyalty among these peoples than that of any other country, except possibly the policies of modern Russia.

The British and the Dutch have varied in their policies somewhat from one colonial area to another, but in general both have, at least officially, attempted to prevent the disruption of native culture,

and made conscious attempts to adjust administrative procedures to local customs. This has been accomplished by recognizing local customs and law, indirect rule, regulation of exploitation, etc. Even so, the chaotic conditions arising from culture impact are as pronounced in some of their possessions as any place in the world.²

One can best understand the nature of the crisis in colonial administration if we shift from these general considerations to the examination of specific cases. For that purpose we shall turn briefly to an analysis of the current situation in Java:

The Netherlands East Indies,³ which includes Java, is a vast island area extending from Sumatra on the west, to the eastern portion of New Guinea on the east, and including the Celebes and most of Borneo. It is an area of 750,000 square miles inhabited by 70,000,000 persons of whom 50,000,000 are in Java which is about the size of New York State. The predominant racial strain is Malay but there are also negroids and pygmies. There are several distinct languages but most people speak a dialect of the Malayo-Polynesian tongue. The European population is about 250,000 of whom most live in Java.

The bitterness of the struggle there, with the indiscriminate killing of both Dutch and Eurasians is the more remarkable when it is realized that previous to the present war, Dutch colonial administration was considered to be as progressive as that of any country. The men who held the top Civil Service positions spent several years of study in universities in Holland. There they learned the language, customs, law and religion of the natives, as well as their administrative duties. The Dutch policy was one of indirect rule wherever possible. Even in areas of direct rule, local government institutions were not disturbed and native law was scrupulously adhered to. The alienation of native lands was prevented, and commercial exploitation strictly regulated. The government had declared a monopoly of pawn shops to eliminate usurious rates previously charged by Arab and Chinese traders. Missionary activities were strictly regulated and in Bali were prohibited to prevent the disturbance of native religion. Although health and education facilities were at a minimum, they represented a tremendous ad-

vance over what had previously obtained. A start had been made toward self-government with the establishment in 1916 of a "Volksraad" with semi-legislative functions. Of the 61 members, the chairman was appointed by the Crown. The other sixty included 30 Indonesians of whom 20 were elected and 10 appointed; 25 Europeans of whom 15 were elected and 10 appointed; and five Arab and Chinese members of whom 3 were elected and 2 appointed. The self-government plan was further liberalized by the announcement in 1942, after occupation by the Japanese, of a plan for dominion status. The Dutch also had a comprehensive plan for economic and social development including popular education, improvement in agriculture, redistribution of population and raising of the standard of living.

Comparatively, Dutch administration was good, but the Indonesians had no way of knowing this, for one of the policies was that of keeping the people isolated and insulated from the rest of the world. Logically, the Dutch colonial service was liberal and enlightened and the most severe criticism was its extreme gradualism. Nevertheless, when the Japanese war machine swept over the Dutch empire one remembers that hardly a hand was raised by the native population to assist the Dutch or to prevent Japanese occupation. The remarks of a Dutch official in San Francisco in 1942, may throw an interesting light on the situation. He admitted that the policies of the United States in Philippines had paid better dividends in terms of resistance to the Japanese than Dutch or British policies elsewhere in Asia, but still maintained that Americans were naive in the way they handled natives. He finally asked "and why do you always have to say 'please' when you ask for something, and 'thank you' when something is done? You have to *tell* the natives what to do, not ask them."

Similar comments are frequently made by persons of all nationalities who work with natives. They are reflections of the feeling of racial and cultural superiority. It is the prevailing attitude taken by almost all colonial administrators and is reflected in most colonial policy. It is the attitude, expressed in policy and behavior, that the natives exist for the benefit of the administrators and that the natives should be thankful for the intelligence and ability of their administrators. This attitude is re-

2. A more detailed description of various national policies on this subject is presented by Kennedy in his chapter previously referred to.

3. Information on the Netherlands East Indies was drawn from recent newspaper accounts and three references: Cole, Fay-Cooper, "The Peoples of Malayasia" (New York 1945) Kennedy, Raymond, "The Ageless Indies" (New York 1942) Vandenbosch, Amry, "The Dutch East Indies" (Berkeley, Calif. 1944) 3rd ed.

vealed in nearly every relation in which the foreigner comes in contact with the native. It appears in the relation between master and servant, in the economic relation between employer and employee. It is part of the caste system of the colonial institution which leads not to gradual reform, as the Dutch had hoped, but violent conflict. In fact, under this system, each liberalization, usually brings no appreciation for the favors granted but more insistent demands, and greater tensions between the two groups, until eruption occurs.

This caste system is supported by a bureaucracy which controls police power and can enforce its domination through military might. The bureaucracy may even be staffed by a majority of natives, but the higher echelons are always reserved for the non-native. Thus, in 1940, of the public service employees of the Netherlands East Indies, only 16.4 per cent were Dutch and Eurasians, but 96.7 per cent of the top positions, 58.1 of the middle and only 4.7 of the lower were held by the Dutch. The Indonesians, conversely, were more numerous in the lower ranks of the civil service.⁴ Although there are no comparable figures for industrial occupations, it is probable that Europeans held a disproportionate share, if not all, of the top positions. This distribution was rationalized by sentiments previously referred to, that natives were not trained, capable, etc.

Unfortunately, for the Dutch, the advent of the Japanese changed the entire situation. The Japanese removed practically all of the Dutch from administration, and except for the key positions substituted Indonesians who formerly held lesser posts. Whether the country ran better or worse is in some ways immaterial, at least it ran. When Allied troops returned under the peace treaty they were welcomed at first, but when the Dutch, released from internment, or newly arrived, sought to pick up where they had left off a few years before, there was resistance. The Indonesians wanted no more of Japanese rule, but for that matter neither did they want the return of the Dutch. As one American newspaper correspondent described the situation, "It is Indonesia's tragedy that the Indonesians hate the Dutch. British businessmen who know Java affirm it is because the Dutch over-exploited the Indonesians; the Indonesians declare it is because the Dutch have given them nothing for the enormous wealth in gasoline and tropical products they have taken from the country--nothing except repressive taxation, clumsy

administration, tyrannous and bureaucratic control of commerce and industry and neglected education."⁵ Even a John Hancock of Revolutionary days fame could hardly have improved on that statement in his indictment of the then existing British colonial policy toward the American colonies. Whether the analogy is sound, or the reasons adequate, and they cannot be either proved or disproved, one must not forget, that from the kind of relations which obtain between the two groups, there may come either hatred, partnership, or perhaps something in between. Examples of partnership are lacking in the colonial world unless one counts the relations of Hawaii and Alaska to the United States, and of the Dominions to Great Britain.

For comparative purposes, and to give additional insight into the colonial institution, I should like to describe a situation with which I was intimately associated in the years 1936-1942. It has to do with the application of policies and program by the Office of Indian Affairs of the Department of Interior to the Navajo Indians, a tribe of some 50,000 people living in the southwestern portion of the United States.

We are interested, among other things, in determining the extent to which the characteristics previously noted of a colonial system are applicable to a people who are geographically an integral part of an independent country. We are also interested in the kind of relations existing between those charged with administering policy, and those who are administered and the rationalizations through which the administering group explains its activities. Finally, we are interested in what principles may be deduced from a comparison of the two situations.

Beginning about 1870 and continuing for the next sixty years, the policy of the Indian Service has been to acculturate the various Indian tribes as rapidly as possible. To further this program the Indian Service had pursued a policy of allotting to each Indian a tract of land to which eventually, a merchantable title would be given. Vocational education was introduced to teach the Indians "white" ways of farming. Boys and girls were removed at an early age and placed in boarding schools, frequently a long distance from their homes, and except for short vacations could not return to their reservations until they had finished school. Excess land was either sold or leased to whites. Traditional customs and ceremonies were either frowned upon or actually

4. New York Times, (November 18, 1945) p. E5.

5. *Ibid.*

prohibited, and missionaries were given encouragement to convert the Indians to Christianity. These policies were never evenly applied, so that there were some Indian groups, such as the Navajo, where the great bulk of the reservation was still held in trust by the government. Availability of funds influenced the extent of vocational training and boarding school development. Mission activity was much greater in some localities than others, and ancient customs and religious beliefs were held to or forgotten depending upon many factors.

Long before initial changes were made in this policy in 1930, it had become apparent to students of Indian affairs, that the policy of turning Indians into white men was a failure. Those who had been removed from the reservation at an early age, and thus cut off from the tradition of their people, had grown to maturity in the artificial institutional environment of the boarding school. Upon graduation they returned to the reservations where they found that they were aliens among their own people, and if they turned to white life in nearby communities they found discrimination and lack of opportunity. It should also be noted that turbulence was not lacking from the scene. Repressive action, involving troops was sometimes found necessary.

With the advent of the New Deal, there also came a "New Day" for the American Indian. John Collier, a long-time advocate of Indian rights, was appointed Commissioner of Indian Affairs. He brought with him the determination to restore the land, expand the economic bases of Indian life, promote the development of indigenous arts and crafts, and to encourage cultural and political self-development. He believed that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion should not be violated, as it had been in our relations with Indian groups, and that they should be allowed to follow the ancient religious beliefs and practices if they wished. Equally important, he believed that the niggardly and short-sighted paternalism of the past, which was the philosophy of the ruling bureaucracy, should be replaced by an intelligent administration in which the Indians, through their own political organization, should share and participate. He believed that there were certain values in Indian life which Indians should be encouraged to preserve, and that the future of the Indian lay not in becoming a deculturized proletariat, but as members of a group possessing individual dignity and with a contribution to make to his own and the rest of American life.

These beliefs and objectives, as they were enunciated found support from many sources. How-

ever, one cannot threaten vested rights of long duration and not expect strong opposition. It should have been no surprise that mission groups, economic interests, and politicians uttered their protests. It should be no less surprising that segments of the Indian Service bureaucracy itself should resist these changes. What interests us most, however, is the opposition which rose from within Indian groups, and that brings us to the history of the application of this new Indian program to the Navajo Indians. Although the full account of these recent years is a fascinating and intricate story, only enough can be included to demonstrate the essential similarity between problems and relationships of the Navajo, and other colonial peoples.

Reference was made earlier to overpopulation, unbalanced economy, destructive exploitation, cultural disintegration, racial and ethnic conflicts, inadequate social services, and an inadequate system of representation as including the crucial problems of colonial people. All of these were found on the Navajo reservation in 1932.

These people, numbering some 50,000, occupy an area of about 16,000,000 acres, or equal in size to the state of West Virginia. Their numbers have increased five-fold in eighty years, and their population density of two to the square mile, although seemingly sparse, is four times the density of white occupied lands in the same region. Their reservation is situated in northwestern New Mexico, northeastern Arizona and includes a small strip of southern Utah. Most of the area could be classed as semi-desert and steppe country, broken by deep canyons, plateaus and a few mountains. It is a country suited for grazing and the Navajos, who acquired sheep and horses at an early date from the Spanish, depend heavily upon livestock for food, and through the sale of wool and animals for the purchase of simple necessities. They also do a small amount of farming although per capita acreage is less than one per person. Navajo rugs and jewelry are world-famous. The Navajos live in separate family groups scattered over this vast area, and for purposes of utilization of forage make one or two seasonal shifts, with their household goods and livestock.

There are a handful of communities where one finds administrative offices, a school, perhaps a hospital, or mission and one or two trading posts. There are also a number of day schools located at strategic spots and usually in close proximity to a trader. These communities are inhabited entirely by whites, with the exception of a few Indians in custodial or similar positions and a handful of econom-

ically destitute who live on the fringes of these settlements.

The "central agency" or government headquarters is located not far from Gallup, New Mexico, and is called Window Rock. Here is found the offices and living quarters of the general superintendent and the most important administrative and technical personnel who are members of his staff. The only Navajos living here are the official interpreters and a handful of domestic servants, girls who have graduated from one of the schools operated by the government. It was here that what became known as "the program" under general Indian Service policy was formulated and administered. It was Window Rock and its officials which became the target of bitter opposition by Navajos, and even by certain groups of whites.

"The Program", to which reference has already been made, was a comprehensive plan for the conservation of resources and economic rehabilitation. It was prepared in response to needs so demanding, that there could be little question of its rational desirability. The drought and depression of the early nineteen-thirties had thrown into bold relief the truly critical condition of the Navajo reservation. The Indians were deeply in debt to the traders who were themselves in dire financial straits. Prices for wool and sheep were hardly sufficient to pay the costs of transportation. Hasty surveys revealed that the extent of soil erosion was alarming and the grass cover had already been destroyed in many areas leaving desert lands. This condition was the direct result of range stocking 100 per cent in excess of the safe carrying capacity. The situation called for immediate action and a widespread stock reduction program was initiated which reduced numbers by tens of thousands, but still left the range critically over-used. It was then that with the technical help of the Soil Conservation Service, detailed studies of actual and potential conditions were made. From these studies there were formulated grazing regulations. Plans were made for irrigation developments. Improved sires for breeding purposes were introduced. An educational program to improve livestock handling methods was initiated. New watering places were constructed, and, in fact, every conceivable activity that would improve the land resources or lead to an improved standard of living became a part of this program. Its success, however, depended upon the reduction of livestock, and under the regulations a plan was worked out to have each owner possessing livestock numbers in excess of an arbitrary number to reduce to that number.

The government activity was tremendous and where there were jobs, there were plentiful takers. But there soon arose an almost universal opposition to all phases of the program. Many attempts were used to gain cooperation and understanding. Meetings called by officials were frequent. At one such gathering in 1936 the superintendent, through an interpreter, carefully explained a number of details of the program and sat down to allow the Indians of the meeting to ask questions or express themselves. One handsome grey haired Navajo arose and in moderate tones made a speech. When he was finished the interpreter turned to the superintendent and said something like this. "You are a fine young man. We wouldn't want any harm to come to you. We hope that you will live a long time. But we want you to know that someday we may have to put a rope around your neck and hang you to a tree like the one under which you are standing. And we wouldn't want to do that." It was later learned that the original plan had been to kidnap the superintendent, but that another Indian, friendly to the government had posted his men with rifles at strategic points to protect the superintendent.

Incidents of a similar kind were not infrequent. Many government employees were threatened and it was a common expression among them to say, "Thank God no one has yet been killed." Many Navajos employed by the government reported that they had been accused of being traitors to their own people, and some of them were fearful of mistreatment.

The government was balked in its attempts to secure voluntary reduction of stock, and so it was decided in 1937 to take several test cases to Federal Court. The more vocal of the opposition who were called politicians, agitators and renegades, by the government, held meetings where the "program" was damned, and money collected to defend the Navajos in the test cases. The opposition had become so strong by the fall of 1938, that the government abandoned further attempts at enforcement and waited for the court decision. In the meantime a government sponsored election had been held for the Tribal Council to replace the so-called "hand-picked" council which because of its agreement to certain portions of the program stood in disrepute. This new council was predominantly anti-government and anti-program.

To guard against a one-sided picture of the situation, comment should be made that there were some Navajos, who although not necessarily in agreement with the objectives and methods of the govern-

ment, were disposed to cooperate. They, with government officials were opposed to the leadership of the "agitators". One should also say that even among those who were most opposed it was possible to preserve some sort of amicable relations on a personal basis. Most families continued to send their children to school. The hospital facilities were still patronized. There was an appearance of normality, but underneath there existed a deep insecurity.

The government won its case in May 1939. That summer and fall approximately 16,000 head of horses were removed. The cooperation was achieved under threat of arrest and jail sentences. There were, however, certain areas where even this threat was insufficient to secure cooperation. Additional court cases were filed. Compliance was sought by an upward revision of the number of animals permitted to one owner. This was only partially accepted and local tension continued to mount until by the summer of 1941 there were fears that the trouble would move from the talking to the shooting stage. There was, at this time, serious discussion of the necessity for calling in troops.

During the war with thousands of young Navajos in the army and other thousands working in mines, in the beet fields, and in the shipyards, the tension and pressure has lessened somewhat. However, the Navajo Rights Association, a group organized to fight the government in its program has increased its strength, and that the bitterness is still there is evidenced by the kidnapping in January of this year of a government employee. One can easily predict that the postwar administrative problems are going to be even more difficult than those in the thirties.

When one begins to make comparisons between the Navajo situation and most colonial trouble-spots, the differences are not great. The United States established control over the Navajo through the use of troops in 1864. Conflict, sometimes violent, has been a pattern of government-Navajo relations since earliest times. Between 1900 and 1914, troops were called by superintendents on four different occasions.

One asks, what is the reason for this conflict? The government is not exploiting either their labor or their land. Each year hundreds of thousands of dollars are poured into the reservation to maintain schools, hospitals, irrigation works, water holes, and to improve the range and livestock. The answer is not a simple one, and in some respects it varies from situations elsewhere.

Basic to the problem is an imposed bureaucracy, separate and apart from the Navajos themselves, and more responsive to pressures developing within itself and from its Washington office, than to those from the Navajo. Related to this problem has been the failure to establish a functional political organization which might give expression to Navajo needs. That is only part of the difficulty, however. The Navajo administration during the past decade, with its large staff of technical specialists and its ability to view the complications of the entire problem of land-man relationships, was in a better position to define problems and prescribe remedies than the Navajos themselves. There can be little question that the program developed to meet the Navajo needs and to permit him to continue to live in his homeland was one of the most comprehensive of any comparable area of the world. Competency of planning and the securing of understanding and cooperation are two different things and it was there that failure appeared. One may ask, why was it impossible to gain cooperation and understanding of a program which logically met many of the critical problems of the Navajo? Two explanations present themselves. One was the manner in which compliance was attempted and the other is the basic cultural pattern of the people who were affected.

First, the program was an imposed one. It was prepared by technical experts and was administered by an agency external to Navajo life and capable of securing compliance through coercion. It met the needs of the Navajo in a manner conceived by technicians and administrators, and not as seen by the natives.

Secondly, the conservation program violated basic cultural factors. To the Navajo, livestock, and especially sheep, are a gift of the gods. They were given that the people might have food and clothing. The possession of large numbers of sheep is a sign of affinity with beneficent spiritual forces. Sheep permit one to fulfill his obligations toward his family and his relatives. A man with many sheep will have many friends, and it is his trust to use what he has for the benefit of those less fortunate. To have many sheep is to have high status, to be able to wear good clothes, and much jewelry, and to eat well. One is able to pay the medicine man who drives away the evil and offending spirits that bring affliction. One is taught from the time he is a small child that if he wishes to have friends and happiness, he must take care of the sheep that are given to him,

and if possible increase the size of his flock. Thus one sees that the opposition to government interference in the ownership and use of livestock comes from deep within the system of sentiments and relationships which bind Navajos to one another. The "program" was a threat to the entire economic, social and religious life of the Navajo, and if the insecurity was deep, it was because the threat was great.

Resistance and conflict in such a situation becomes inevitable. The Navajos can hardly ask nor do they want, independence from the United States, but they have asked and will continue to demand, greater self-government, and opportunity for becoming members of the bureaucracy which governs them. Their future struggles will probably repeat the pattern elsewhere with official resistance to these demands expressed in such terms as "they are not yet ready, they do not have trained technical personnel, when they have had more experience in running their own affairs, then the time will be ripe, etc."

Returning once again to the larger problems of the relations between colonial administration and native peoples, any real change in the institution of colonial administration is not going to come until administrators are willing to utilize more fully the knowledge of the students of the science of human relations and culture. Perhaps the difficulty in which they find themselves now is so great that they will accept anything, even the assistance of the social scientist. On the Navajo reservation, it sometimes took months to get acceptance by the administrators of simple cultural facts which merely explained some of the opposition. It was infinitely more difficult to get agreement for modification, not of the objectives of the program, but of the procedures, that they

might be somewhat more palatable. It proved impossible to gain assent to proposals which would make the Navajos full participants in building and carrying through a program. If that was the situation under liberal policy and wise leadership, one can appreciate how much more difficult the problem will be elsewhere.

If the colonial powers are actually going to fulfill their obligations toward native peoples, then they must really mean what they say when they refer to the period of trusteeship as the period of preparation for independence. The colonial administrator would then be judged on the basis of how fast he could work himself out of a job, because as people move toward economic self-sufficiency and political wisdom, they do so only as the opportunities are made for them, or as in the past, as they are gained by conflict. Past experience makes one pessimistic that there is going to be this kind of administration, but assuming it does come would this prevent conflict? Although the answer is no, the amount of tension will be greatly lessened, and the possibilities of open conflict reduced to a minimum, because an administration that would use even the limited amount of knowledge that is now known of human relations and culture would direct the aggressive spirit of a people into purposeful activity.

The crisis in colonial administration will not disappear until relations with native peoples are put on a basis of mutuality that is not a part of the colonial institution as it is known or practiced today. If colonial administration is to meet the obligations under the new concept of "trusteeship", there must be joint participation and responsibility with native peoples. The development of the techniques through which this becomes possible should be one of the objectives of the applied social scientist.

THE USE OF SOCIAL SCIENTISTS BY THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

By

Edward H. Spicer

When persons of Japanese ancestry were evacuated from their homes in Pacific Coast states by Army order in the spring of 1942, a civilian agency was created to meet the problems of the displaced population. This agency, the War Relocation Authority, assumed responsibility for (1) adminis-

tering the 110,000 people in ten camps, called relocation centers, hastily built in western states and Arkansas and (2) planning and carrying out a program for re-establishing the evacuees in normal American communities. The activities of the War Relocation Authority in administering the group ex-